The withdrawal of French influence in Africa: features and causes

 

 

The last few years witnessed the rise of Russian influence in the region at the expense of French decline, with Turkish attempts to penetrate the African Horn and Sahel regions, as well as American attempts to regain control in Africa. It was noted during these years that geopolitical considerations became the dominant factor in the major powers’ dealings with Africa. The increasing international push to exploit African resources has led to proxy conflicts throughout the region.

 

The United States, China, Russia, and other traditional major powers and rising middle powers compete for control of natural resources and strategic trade routes. This was accompanied by two main trends: Firstly, It is represented by the expansion of transnational terrorist networks in the Sahel and East Africa in a broad sense, which is based on the presence of an abundance of roaming foreign fighters. Secondly, The proliferation of foreign military bases amid rising Sino-American geopolitical tensions. The year 2022 came and its most important features were in Africa. Increased Russian influence at the expense of French decline; It was likely that Russia would try to exploit the vacuum resulting from the reduction of the French military presence in the Sahel region, which would lead to changing the structure of alliances with and among armed groups. France's plan to reduce the number of forces present in the Sahel region from February 2022 has prompted Mali's military rulers to turn to Russia to fill this security vacuum.

 

Features of the French decline in Africa

Here we can focus on two main features: Firstly, Collapse of the French security system in the Sahel: The security system that France put in place in the Sahel region of Africa in 2013 began to collapse very quickly, after the demonstrations against France’s presence in the region spread to Chad, Mali’s withdrawal from the Sahel group, and the President of Niger’s announcement of the death of this alliance. Nearly 10 years of French military intervention in the Sahel region demonstrated to the peoples of the region Paris’s failure to bring stability to the region, after armed groups expanded into areas they had never dreamed of before 2013. Secondly, The Russian-Turkish blockade of France in the Sahel countries: The current scene in the African Sahel cannot be read in isolation from the developments taking place on the global scene. The Western-Russian conflict did not end at the borders of Ukraine, Syria, or Libya. Rather, it extended to the African Sahel region. Russia surrounds French influence in Chad from various aspects, through its military advisors and Wagner Company mercenaries, deployed in the Central African Republic to the south, the Libyan Fezzan region to the north, the Sudanese Darfur region to the east, and Mali to the west, as it is only separated from the Chadian border by Niger which also Russia succeeded in infiltrating it through the recent coup there. Turkey is also working with maximum force to establish a foothold in Africa and compete with both France and Russia there.

 

Russia and the decline of French influence in Africa

In contrast to the French withdrawal, A Russian breakthrough emerged in an effort to regain influence by a returning power. This is taking place amidst international chaos, with the strengthening of the Chinese presence and the erosion of the presence of the former colonial powers. While France announced the decision to end Operation Barkhane in the Sahel region, and recorded a decline in West Africa, the historical stronghold of French influence, Bamako, the capital of Mali, witnessed demonstrations demanding Russian intervention, similar to what happened in the Central African Republic. This indicates that in the context of conflicts between competing powers, the paradox emerges between the French retreat and the Russian penetration, which indicates the intensification of the conflict between the old colonial powers, the powers defending their interests, and the rising powers. The Kremlin has relied on the Central African Republic as a gateway to penetrate and spread influence, and it can be said that Moscow has succeeded in weakening France as the historically dominant foreign power there.

 

This achievement was accompanied by extracting the advantages of the French role in the areas of training the army and the presidential guard, security of institutions, and gold and silver mines in exchange for a share of the income and economic benefits. Note that Russian companies are interested and active in diamond, gold, and other mineral mines in Africa, just as France, which relies heavily on uranium coming especially from Niger. In the context of strategic-economic competition, African affairs experts agree on the presence of Wagner mercenaries in many African countries, including Libya, Angola, Guinea, Mozambique, South Africa, and the Congo. They draw attention to Moscow’s signing of cooperation agreements with about twenty countries on the continent. The impact of the Russian penetration on the decline of the French role in several African countries is evident as follows:

 

Chad: Among other Russian penetrations, there are rumors that Wagner supported the Chadian rebels against the Chadian army (during the battles, former President Idriss Deby, a friend of the Americans and the French, fell), which, according to some circles, hides a decision to make decisive changes against French influence.

Mali: It is one of the former French colonies in the Sahel region of Africa and French forces were stationed there as part of Operation Barkhane, which fights extremist groups in the region, which Macron recently announced its end, amid a series of coups not only in Mali but also in Chad and recently Guinea. Mali has recently witnessed demands for a French exit, with the increasing Russian presence there, especially through Wagner mercenaries.

Guinea: which represents another episode of that conflict, as analyzes indicated that the coup carried out by Colonel Mamadou Dombayo, through which he overthrew President Alpha Condé, came within the framework of this conflict, as Condé’s relationship with Paris had become tense since he amended the constitution last year and won. In presidential elections, he remained in office for a third term. France was one of the first countries to condemn Guinea's coup ten days ago, as the French Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that it "condemns the attempt to seize power by force" in Guinea, and calls for "the immediate and unconditional release of President Alpha Condé." But the reality of things indicates that the French condemnation is just a formality, as it did not impose any sanctions on the coup plotters in Conakry and did not freeze its military cooperation with them, as it did months ago in the recent Mali coup. Colonel Dumbayo, the leader of the coup in Guinea, served in the French army for 15 years, in the 25th Regiment of the Foreign Legion, until 2018 when he left to take command of the special forces in his country, and he is married to a French woman.

 

Reasons for the French decline in Africa

Here we can talk about several important points..

Firstly, The duality of French discourse: There is a French discourse characterized by duality. At a time when President Macron adopts an official discourse calling for rebalancing relations, transparency, and a win-win partnership, reality and practice confirm the continuation of old practices. For example, Paris's desire to transfer certain industries to France has recently emerged, with Africa's talent being depleted through economic immigration plans to Paris. All this in light of the ambitions of French companies to continue selling manufactured products with high added value, from radars to trains to planes and boats.

Secondly, Decline of French economic diplomacy: In 2018, Africa represented only 2.4% of French foreign trade compared to 35% after independence. What is interesting to consider is that Germany has become the first European country to export to Sub-Saharan Africa, which means its emergence as a strong competitor to France in its former regional space. This is despite the reliance of French presidents since Sarkozy on the private sector to rehabilitate the dynamics of the French-African relationship.

Thirdly, The geopolitical reshaping of Africa: The recent waves of coups in the Sahel and West Africa, which were linked to the economic crisis resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic, and the escalation of the terrorist tide in the region, prompted a number of African countries to refocus on their domestic agendas and turn to external partners capable of providing them with practical responses to urgent and pressing problems. This clearly embodied the emergence of a new populist discourse in the region that is anti-France and supportive of the Russian presence, as reflected in the experience of the Mali state. On the other hand, Fissures occurred in former Francophone areas. As in the Maghreb region, where the chronic rivalry and hostility between Algeria and Morocco has intensified in recent years, as well as in the Sahel region, which suffers from internal divisions and external penetrations in addition to the deteriorating security conditions.

Fourthly, Militarization of French politics: since the false independence granted to former French colonies in 1960; French power was expressed only through a military perspective, as France conducted more than 70 military operations in Africa. Moreover, there are cooperation agreements with African militaries that are not subject to accountability or transparency. This militarization created, in the collective African subconscious, a rejection of France and its way of operating.

 

Conclusion, Recently, the voice of African anger against the French presence has become louder. For example, we saw this in Chad recently against the backdrop of accusations of interference in the affairs of countries and support of authoritarian regimes. The popular protests against the French presence in Chad were similar to what happened in Mali in terms of protest demonstrations in which various popular groups participated in denouncing the French presence in their country. The French flag was even burned in those demonstrations. This confirms the great impasse that France has fallen into in several African countries. In addition to Mali and Chad, France faces great rejection in Burkina Faso, Central Africa, Libya, and Algeria, due to its colonial policy aimed at controlling the sovereign decisions of African countries and plundering their wealth. Several data show that the peoples of African countries and some of their leaders are seeking to move away from France, and move towards new alliances similar to Turkey and Russia, which seek to enhance their influence and political standing in the Sahel-Saharan region for several reasons, including political, economic, military and security. Some African countries that have previously signed defense agreements with France, such as Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania, are looking forward to signing defense agreements - or have already signed - with Russia and Turkey, especially since these two countries are known for producing advanced weapons at cheap prices compared to French weapons. Russia has already achieved successes at the military and security levels.